Overview of the Colombian indigenous movement by Jackson, Jean E.
OVERVIEW OF THE COLOMBIAN INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT 
 
Jean E. Jackson 
jjackson@mit.edu 
 
Department of Anthropology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION1
 This essay examines the emergence of Colombia’s indigenous people as a political force, 
focusing in particular on the unequal relationship between indigenous communities (pueblos) 
and the state, as well as the effects of the half-century of violence.  I first provide some general 
information about the pueblos and a brief history of indigenous organizing. A summary of 
changes brought about by the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente (ANC), and the Constitución 
Política of 1991 follows. I then provide a short overview of the Constitution’s successes and 
failures with respect to indigenous concerns, a brief comment on language loss, and, finally, 
Discussion and Conclusions.  
 
 
1.1. Overview of Colombia’s Indigenous Communities. 
Colombia’s indigenous people form at least 81 distinct pueblos and speak 64 different 
languages. In 1997, adjusted figures based on the 1993 census predicted a population of 701,860, 
out of a total predicted population of 40,214,723 (Arango and Sánchez 2004: 39). According to 
the 2005 national census (http://www.dane.gov.co/censo), 1,392,623 citizens self-identified as 
indigenous, constituting 3.4 per cent of a national population of 41,468,384 citizens. 
From the comparatively densely populated Andean communities to the smaller and more 
dispersed communities in the plains and tropical forests regions, the nation’s indigenous people 
have always been extremely marginalized, socially, politically, and economically. During the 
colonial era the Crown created a system of collectively owned resguardos,2 in part to protect the 
communities from exploitation so rapacious that they were in danger of disappearing entirely 
(and, with them, a valuable labor source). Independence from Spain ushered in an ideology and 
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legislation promoting nation-building, which required forging a homogeneous Spanish-speaking, 
Catholic, and patriotic citizenry. From that time until the 1960s, state-sponsored indigenista 
policies were concerned to incorporate Indians into the general population via racial mixing and 
cultural assimilation. Indigenous communal landholding came to be seen as especially inimical 
to the nation-building project, and legislation intended to dismantle the resguardos was 
promulgated.  However, Law 89 of 1890, passed by the Conservatives then in power, slowed 
down the “progressivist” legislative trend that had arisen during the 19th century that had worked 
to privatize collective lands and eliminate tribute-paying. The 1890 legislation recognized the 
official status of the resguardo and legalized the cabildos, indigenous councils that governed the 
communities. Cabildos had been part of the Crown’s attempt to centralize and urbanize the 
scattered “uncivilized” indigenous populations. Cabildos continue to be the legal institution 
governing each pueblo’s internal affairs, in accordance with its traditions. The 1890 law also 
strengthened indigenous claims to lands with colonial titles (all in highland areas), and became the 
foundation for the efforts to recover illegally alienated territory that began in the 1960s. In 1988 
Decree 2001 defined the resguardo as a special kind of legal and socio-political institution formed 
by an indigenous community or entire indigenous ethnic group. 
During most of this century the Colombian state basically left the task of governing and 
civilizing the nation’s indigenous population to the Church; for example, a January 1953 Treaty 
put it in charge of all indigenous education. In 1962 the Summer Institute of Linguistics/Wycliffe 
Bible Translators was permitted to begin placing linguist-missionaries in indigenous 
communities (see Stoll 1982: 165-197). 1960 saw the founding of the División de Asuntos 
Indígenas (DAI), the government agency in charge of the country’s pueblos. Ostensibly an 
advocate for indigenous interests, DAI has consistently been criticized for implicitly supporting 
an indigenist approach and only gesturing to the need to respect cultural difference (Jimeno and 
Triana 1985; also see Jackson, 2002). Up to the present, traditional vested interests have 
continued their attempts to colonize indigenous lands, promote their version of development, and 
find ways to exploit indigenous labor. 
 
1.2. History of Indigenous Organizing 
Colombian pueblos in Andean areas began to organize to fight for land rights during the 
first half of the twentieth century. In the 1920s, influenced by Marxist values, activists partially 
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rejected the assimilationist positions held by both the Left and Right, and adopted a discourse 
promoting indigenousness and the “indigenous proletariat.” The most famous leader of that time, 
Manuel Quintín Lame, a Páez (a pueblo now known as Nasa) eventually came to support 
indigenous separatism (see Pineda 1984; Gros 1991; Rappaport 1990). During the 1930s and 
1940s, the struggle for land by indigenous communities and non-indigenous peasants was taken 
up by the Movimiento Agrarista in the southern part of the department of Tolima. Marxist and 
Liberal guerrillas continued this struggle against the Conservative government of the 1950s, 
forming the “independent republics” that evolved into insurgent groups, two of which remain in 
arms today: the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), and the Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional (ELN). 
 In 1970, the Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos (ANUC) was formed to 
ensure enactment of the land reform laws passed in 1961. ANUC soon divided, and indigenous 
people from various departments formed a Secretaría Indígena Nacional within one faction. 
Upon realizing that ANUC was only interested in campesinando its indigenous members, they 
left and formed the Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca (CRIC) in early 1971, to continue the 
fight for land rights and as a defense against severe repression from guerrilla armies and the 
national armed forces. Demanding implementation of the agrarian reform laws mandating 
expansion of indigenous resguardos, as well as reclaiming resguardos titled by the Crown, CRIC 
(and, subsequently, other organizations representing highland pueblos) fought many bloody 
battles. 
When the state realized that the repossessions were going to continue, despite 
imprisonment and other forms of repression (legal and illegal), it reversed its position and sought 
to institute a way to make land recovery occur in a legal framework. The Instituto Colombiano 
de Reforma Agraria (INCORA) was established in 1961, but it would take further struggle 
before its perspective on communally held land would dovetail with those of indigenous 
communities (see Findji 1992: 119-121; Jimeno and Triana 1985). 
The indigenous activism was opposed not only by local landowners and the government, 
but also the Church, which owned extensive landholdings in some areas. For example, earlier in 
the century the Church had mounted a campaign to convince Indians that they had no claim to 
the land because it was actually unused public land (baldío), and therefore available to “whoever 
would work it and make it worth something” (Jimeno 1985: 184). 
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Although CRIC declared itself to be an indigenous organization, it has never identified 
itself with a particular pueblo (although most of its members are Nasa). María Teresa Findji 
states that at the beginning CRIC lacked an “ethnic” vision, as its organizing principle was social 
class (1992: 118). CRIC in fact maintained links with other sectors of rural society, which helped 
to amplify its potential for mass mobilization. However, in the fall of 1971 CRIC modified its 
charter to include the defense of “indigenous history, language and customs” (Consejo Regional 
Indígena del Cauca 1981: 12). CRIC’s own version of its history acknowledges that at the very 
beginning “we ourselves believed that being indio was not good, and that in order to progress we 
had to copy what came from the exterior” (Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca 1981: 11). In 
1974 CRIC began the newspaper Unidad Indígena, which continues to be published. 
During 1976-1981 the government attempted to pass a repressive “Indigenous Law” that 
effectively gave the state extensive power over the pueblos, including the authority to determine 
who was and was not indigenous (Triana 1978). The organized resistance continued, however, 
bouyed up by highly critical press reports of massacres of Indians, as well as activists’ alliance-
building with peasant groups and other left organizations. A nation-wide group, the 
Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia (ONIC) was founded in 1982; by 1986 sixteen 
indigenous organizations had appeared (Avirama and Márquez 1995: 84). ONIC was recognized 
by the government in 1983 and became an official participant in several governmental programs 
concerned with indigenous affairs. 
Beginning in the 1980s Colombia has handed over land, at times very large tracts of it, to 
its indigenous communities, a policy arising in part in response to the at times violent land 
repossession campaigns in the country’s Andean regions, and in part in response to demands that 
the 1961 land reform legislation be implemented. As of 2000 the pueblos collectively and 
inalienably owned approximately 28 million fully demarcated hectares, 85% in the plains and 
tropical forest, constituting over one fourth of the national territory (see Roldán 2000 xxiii, xxiv, 
49, 50). 
One result of the organizing has been a substantial portion of the country’s Indians 
beginning to see the collectivity of the nation’s pueblos as an “imagined community” (Anderson 
1983). This incipient development of a generic Colombian indigenous identity was a major 
change from the more limited pueblo-specific identity characteristic of the past. Indeed, in earlier 
periods, when given the chance, Indians who would militantly affirm their pueblo membership 
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would explicitly disavow membership in the highly stigmatized category “indio.” For example, 
Findji, discussing several Guambiano communities’ decision to leave CRIC over disagreements 
about (among other things) how to conceptualize territory, describes their desire to be seen as 
neither campesino nor generically indigenous, but strictly as Guambiano: “We don’t want to be 
‘humiliated’ indígenas—we want to defend, for our children’s sake, our right to be Guambianos” 
(Findji 1992: 122). However, beginning in the 1970s, a process of change and restructuring 
provided both incentives and opportunities for the development (and politicization) of a generic 
indigenous identity. Political liberalization on the part of the government slowly reduced 
repressive responses to indigenous demands, thus opening up space for broader efforts at 
organization and more inclusive claims. Indigenous leaders became increasingly aware of 
indigenous organizing elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, as well as the environmentalist 
movement. A resignification of “indigenous” took place, its meaning increasingly relying on the 
interplay between negotiated otherness and self-conscious efforts to maintain cultural continuity. 
In fact, what had been a stigmatizing identity for these communities, as illustrated by the 
Guambiano example above, turned into an identity entailing symbolic and political capital. As a 
consequence, indigenous demands began to be couched less in a discourse of minority rights and 
more in terms of rights they possessed as an autochthonous people. 
As happened elsewhere in Latin America, the Colombian indigenous movement, while 
continuing with its efforts to gain access to the political institutions of the state, came to focus 
much more than before on strengthening the pueblos’ own institutions. Cultural recovery 
projects increased in number and visibility, as did their significance, both for the pueblos’ self-
conceptualization and in their interactions with the non-indigenous world. 
These evolving notions about indigeneity and their impact on activist strategizing had far-
reaching effects, one of which was to change the meaning of indigenous territory, which in turn 
produced alterations in land claims discourses, in particular how claims were justified. Territory 
came to be seen in more comprehensive ways: as land, yes, but also as the underpinnings of self-
determination, a “fundamental and multidimensional space for the creation and re-creation of the 
social, economic, and cultural values and practices of the communities” (Grueso et al. 1998: 20).  
The way collective land rights were secured (or denied) increasingly depended on 
instantiations and demonstrations that reflected (or were seen as failing to reflect) evolving 
imaginaries of indigeneity that were coming to be shared by indigenous and non-indigenous 
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alike. Land claims increasingly were based on claims to a core, intrinsic, positively valenced 
indigenous identity, an identity that bolstered other kinds of claims—to self-determination, 
autonomous jurisdiction, etc. These sets of claims were increasingly validated by performances 
intended to represent culturally distinct customary practices and traditions. Of course, the state 
continued, as it had in the past, to deny land claims by rejecting applicants’ indigenousness; what 
was new was the degree of participation by the pueblos themselves in establishing criteria for 
defining pueblo members’ otherness. 
In sum, new parameters emerged for indigenous involvement in state affairs. The country 
was moving toward a pluralist conception of itself, a notion that, once enshrined in the 1991 
Constitution, would require a respect for the autonomy of indigenous institutions never before 
imagined. 
 Indigenous identity had itself become a strategy in many important venues. What it 
meant, never predetermined, became much more unstable as all actors repeatedly modified their 
discourses in response to multiculturalism’s new role and the shifting terms of engagement. And 
indigenous identity not only became a political resource, it turned into a moral reproach to status 
quo hegemonic institutions like the state and the Church. Indeed, as elsewhere in the Americas, it 
came to stand for a critique of several basic characteristics of Western society as a whole. 
 
2. THE 1991 CONSTITUTION 
Advocates for rewriting the country’s constitution felt that the old 1886 constitution was 
extremely rigid, inefficient, and overly centralized. Democratic foundational charter in name 
only, it favored the Conservatives and, more generally, the privileged and powerful. The drive 
for constitutional reform arose from awareness that the current social order, in which access to 
the government was gained exclusively through political parties (all other attempts being ignored 
or treated as subversion), was incapable of adapting to changing social conditions (Van Cott 
2000: 63-89). The political and moral crisis resulting from the insurgency, the increase in 
violence as landowners and security forces attempted to stamp it out, and a pervasive distrust of 
a deeply corrupt state controlled by the oligarchy, also strengthened arguments promoting 
constitutional reform (see Assies 2000: 3). Especially during the 1980s, the unending states of 
seige and the depredations of the illegal drug cartels at times seemed to paralyze the state, 
making its inadequacies glaringly apparent. 
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Constitutional reform was intended to decentralize power and create a more open and 
legitimate political system. The original agenda had not included benefiting the country’s 
minorities, but during the ANC deliberations several political interests, not just indigenous and 
Afro-Colombian, realized that advocating pluralism brought them closer to their own goals. The 
debates opened up new spaces for democratic participation, and civil society hesitantly began to 
give voice to its concerns. These democratic reforms began a process of reconfiguring the 
relationship between state, market, and civil society. Notions of participation and empowerment, 
previously limited to oppositional social movements and NGOs, began to appear in 
governmental discourse, notably in the Constitution itself (see Assies 2000: 2, 3). 
 
2.1. Pueblos and the Constitution. 
With respect to indigenous rights Colombia’s new constitution is the most far-reaching in 
Latin America. The Charter recognizes that Colombia is a multicultural and pluriethnic society, 
and asserts that “El Estado reconoce y protege la diversidad étnica y cultural de la Nación 
colombiana” (Article 7). The media focus during the ANC on the three indigenous 
representatives, Francisco Rojas Birry, Lorenzo Muelas, and Alfonso Peña Chepe, was 
remarkable, in particular their contributions to the ANC deliberations. The symbolic role the 
three delegates played was also substantial, for they represented the extent to which the nation’s 
pueblos had come to symbolize tolerance and pluralism, a rediscovered national identity, historic 
reconciliation, justice, political effectiveness, and participatory legitimacy (Van Cott 2000: 72). 
Their participation conveyed the promise of new approaches to conflict resolution that would be 
based on respect and dialogue rather than violence. Some authors suggest that the indigenous 
representatives helped to give legitimacy to the government and the entire ANC process. Donna 
Van Cott notes that the administration of César Gaviria (1990-1994) “offered the protection of 
ethnic minority rights as a highly visible emblem of the new regime of rights protection” (2000: 
74). A government that had been closely associated with assimilationist policies doing an about-
face and guaranteeing the rights of its most marginalized population would show how the most 
peripheral sectors were being incorporated into the democratic process, both as citizens in good 
standing and as citizens belonging to unique communities whose distinctiveness the state 
recognized, valued, and promised to protect (Van Cott 2000: 74). Scholars refer to such an 
arrangement as “differential citizenship.” In short, the reconstitution of state-indigenous 
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relations, by moving from a paternalistic, assimilationist stance to one recognizing the pueblos’ 
rights—to autonomy, dignity, and self-determination—became an emblem of the overall goal of 
reconstituting relations between the state and society as a whole. 
 
2.2. Achievements in constitutional reform related to the pueblos.  
The new Constitution significantly benefitted Colombia’s indigenous pueblos in a 
number of ways. The pueblos were guaranteed two seats in the senate, and in fact, three 
indigenous senators were elected. Most important was its mandate specifying that the new 
territorial ordenation would include “indigenous territorial entities” (EntidadesTerritoriales 
Indígenas—ETIs) (see Dover and Rappaport 1996; Jackson 1998; Roldán 2000: 33-59). It also 
confirmed collective ownership of resguardos, and the pueblos’ right to use their territories as 
they saw fit, including any decision-making about development. Unfortunately, the assignment 
of subsoil rights to the government significantly contradicts these territorial guarantees, and by 
now, the never-written ETI legislation mandate is moot. 
Another benefit was the recognition of customary law (usos y costumbres), which 
allowed indigenous communities to settle their internal affairs, even in criminal cases, so long as 
the basic law of the land was not violated (see Sánchez 1998: 71-120). 
Among the legal mechanisms set up by the Constitution, the writ of protection—acción 
de tutela—has definitely benefited the nation’s indigenous pueblos, for it “empowers citizens to 
appeal for immediate court action when their fundamental constitutional rights are violated and 
no other judicial means are available” (Van Cott 2000: 87). Another reform, the establishment of 
the Constitutional Court, has resulted in the upholding of the rights of many citizens, including 
pueblo members. Van Cott notes that the Court has issued an accumulated jurisprudence on 
indigenous rights and jurisdiction far more extensive than anywhere else in Latin America (2000: 
112). 
In addition, the Constitution strengthened ethno-education and other programs tailored to 
permit cultural distinctiveness (for example, in health) that had been legislated during the 1980s. 
The Constitution also mandated more direct transfers of state resources to the resguardos. 
Legislation to implement these transfers began under Gaviria and continued through the rest of 
the decade. 
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In order to educate the indigenous communities about the reforms, the DAI 
commissioned translations of the constitution into seven major indigenous languages (Rojas 
1997), and established, in collaboration with ONIC, educational programs to allow Indians to 
achieve a basic understanding of their constitutional rights (Van Cott 2000: 90). The translation 
project graphically revealed the wide gulf between native concepts (about justice, law, rights, 
obligations of government, etc.) and Western positive law. 
Articles 10 and 68 declare that “la enseñanza que se imparta en las comunidades con 
tradiciones linguísticas propias será bilingüe.” In 2000 the Instituto Caro y Cuervo published 
Lenguas indígenas de Colombia: Una visión descriptiva, a project perhaps more comprehensive 
than equivalent efforts elsewhere in Latin America (El Espectador, 22 junio 2000). The work 
had begun before the Constitution was signed, but in the 1990s and up to the present there is 
evidence of greatly increased interest on the part of mainstream society not only in the ancient 
cultures and archival evidence of their languages, but of present-day indigenous ones. The exact 
number of extant languages is not entirely clear; Lenguas indígenas discusses 65 of them.  
 
3. THE POST-CONSTITUTION SITUATION 
 
3.1. Continuing Problems.  Several long-standing problems that were not sufficiently addressed 
by the Constitution (or not addressed at all) virtually guaranteed that it would not accomplish 
many of its creators’ goals. The traditional parties, legislature, and post-Constitution 
administrations have successfully limited effective participation by citizens in many domains. 
Colombia coontinues to be something of a “façade” democracy; as Alvárez et al. (1998: 9) note, 
in such countries the majority of citizens have come to regard politics as the private business of 
the elites, and too few participate in anything more than minimal fashion. Moreover, despite the 
reforms’ attention to improving the situation in rural areas, the state still does not control a 
significant amount of the national territory. Its presence limited to military and police in many 
remote areas, along with a total absence in others, leaves the local population under the rule of 
guerrilla forces, illegal paramilitaries, or, more recently, neoparamilitaries (Brodzinsky 2010). 
The violence that continues to grip the country has deep roots. Horrendous interparty 
warfare during the decade known as “La Violencia” (1948-1957) resulted in 150,000-200,000 
deaths (Van Cott 2000: 39). The subsequent establishment of a Popular Front requiring alternate 
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power-holding between the parties and equal distribution of important posts, ended in 1974. 
Throughout the twentieth century the Colombian state has responded to even legal forms of 
leftist dissent with vicious repression. The governments of Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) and 
Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) began reaching out with peace initiatives and encouragement of 
debate about how to establish a more open political system. Constitutional reform came to be 
seen as the best path toward spearheading the peace process and decreasing the radical Left’s 
appeal. With the exception of the FARC and ELN, all other armed groups demobilized in 1990 
in order to be able to participate in the ANC debates.  
The half-century of violence has continued. The Colombian media report civilian 
massacres, “disappearances,” kidnappings, assassinations, extortion, and sabotage. Human-rights 
activists, politicians, labor organizers, journalists, and judges are particularly targeted. Evidence 
of human rights abuses linked to the army and police, who operate with near-total impunity, 
abounds. The judicial system continues to be paralyzed with respect to prosecuting criminals and 
enforcing sentencing. Four and one half million Colombians, out of a total of approximately 
forty-five million, are internally displaced, having fled the numerous areas of intense conflict, 
and living in the zonas de miseria that surround every urban center. 
Other remaining problems include the glaringly obvious failure of the neoliberal 
economic model to democratize the distribution of the nation’s wealth. While a sector of 
Colombians has benefited from la apertura that was legislated during the 1990s, major economic 
dislocations increased the sense of crisis. Income disparities that were already serious increased. 
At the beginnning of the 1990s, approximately 50% of the population was already living in 
absolute poverty (Van Cott 2000: 49, 248). The Constitution is totally mute regarding these ever-
increasing inequalities of wealth, and subsequent court decisions have not taken such reforms as 
their mandate. 
Colombia’s drug problem remains extremely serious. The US-dominated international 
market guarantees that vast sums of narcodollars will continue to flow into the country, and so it 
is no surprise that both guerrillas and paramilitaries quickly filled the spaces left by the 
dismantling of the cartels during the administration of Ernesto Samper (1998-2002). 
Nor did the constitutional reform touch the military, either in its structure or in its 
abysmal performance with respect to human rights abuses, which puts the reform’s main goal, 
ending the cycle of violence, completely out of reach. The role played by the US is substantial. 
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Supporting the Colombian government via the multi-billion dollar Plan Colombia and The 
Andean Regional Initiative has resulted in ineffective reform of the country’s security forces, in 
particular the army, with its dreadful human rights record and links to paramilitaries and 
neoparamilitaries. 
3.2. Post-Constitution problems specifically affecting the pueblos. 
During the ANC indigenous activism was weakened by divisions within the movement, 
some of them resulting from organizations with a national presence like ONIC sponsoring their 
own candidates for election. Although the movement comes together during times of crisis, and 
although overall it has achieved a remarkable maturity and sophistication, factionalism is 
systemic. By 1994 electoral politics had proven so disruptive that the only recourse for ONIC 
was to abandon its ambitions in that arena. ONIC has always struggled to define its role in the 
national political scene, searching for a model of political activism that works. At times it 
encounters a conflict of interest between its mandate to represent all of the country’s pueblos and 
its own politics; other times its complicated relationship to the state (in particular DAI) produces 
problems. Serious ideological differences, both internal and with regard to other national 
indigenous organizations, fuel the divisions as well. 
It became clear to indigenous leaders that the reforms could not address most of the 
problems the country was facing. A major factor has been the tight connection between the 
democratic reforms and the concomitant adoption of neoliberal policies that mandate 
decentralization, an end to the corporatist state model, and implementation of structural 
adjustment policies. Such policies require a concomitant “social and cultural adjustment” on the 
part of citizens to accept greater responsibility and to participate in civil society to a much 
greater degree. Civil society is envisioned now as the vehicle responsible for delivering many of 
the services previously performed by the state. This goal of “minimalist” government has had 
enormous consequences for Colombia’s pueblos. Although Colombia has established a “safety 
net” (Red de Solidaridad) to ease the burden of structural adjustment on the poorest sectors, the 
drastic cuts in public services and elimination of price supports and subsidies for the agrarian 
sector have impacted disproportionately on the pueblos, both highland and lowland. The land 
reform agency, INCORA, has effectively been gutted, replaced by an ineffectual agency with 
only twenty per cent of the former budget (Murillo 2009: 29). 
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The adverse consequences of the neoliberal policies of the last two decades have done 
less harm, however, than the violence virtually all pueblos are currently experiencing. 
Indigenous communities are targeted by all the armed groups: military, 
paramilitaries/neoparamilitaries, and guerrillas. Indigenous leaders are killed with impunity. 
Although the government as such has dropped its overt repression of indigenous organizing and 
no longer assumes that political opposition equals subversion, many authorities in the rural areas 
continue to assume that Indians are either actual or potential supporters of the guerrillas—due to 
their geographical location and their poverty—and hence appropriate targets for 
counterinsurgency measures. The administration of Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) has consistently 
expressed its disapproval of indigenous autonomy projects, their “active neutrality” position with 
respect to armed actors, and their mass political protests. An example of the latter is the October 
2009 Indigenous and Popular Minga in which 40,000 participated in a march to Bogotá 
protesting the proposed free trade agreements with the U.S., Canada, and Europe. 
Large sections of indigenous territory are occupied by guerrillas, paramilitaries and 
military detachments, and Indians are compelled to serve as guides or informers, often by 
threatening their families (Roldán 2000). Some Indians do voluntarily join the guerrillas and, 
occasionally, even the paramilitaries—to protect their families in areas under paramilitary 
control, or for the promise of a uniform and pay. Also, some individuals unfortunately become 
involved in drug trafficking, either with criminals or one of the armed groups. In some 
communities, Indians grow illegal crops (coca and opium poppies), sometimes by choice, 
sometimes under duress from armed actors. The impact on the traditional subsistence economy 
and social order is severe. In addition to intrafamilial disputes, health problems and possible 
legal penalties, Indians face potential loss of livelihood and health risks from fumigation of 
fields, as well as a scarcity of essential commodities like gasoline, due to government efforts to 
decrease production of coca paste (basuco). The US campaign of aerial spraying of fumigants to 
eradicate coca and poppy cultivation at best destroys only one-fourth of the coca crop (and 
replanting can commence in two weeks). Fumigants’ ability to destroy subsistence crops and 
sharply reduce fish and game has been well documented. The Kofán, located in the Putumayo 
region, one of the areas being heavily sprayed, have suffered enormously from the spraying. 
Although the U.S. claims that only large-scale coca cultivation is targeted, a great deal of 
evidence demonstrates that small communities have been seriously impacted.  
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4. THREATS TO INDIGENOUS LANGUAGES 
The continuing violence threatens Colombia’s pueblos in a number of ways. The most 
direct is, of course, violence directed at communities. The nation’s newspapers provide articles 
with numbing regularity about all armed combatants’ disregard for the pueblos’ stated policy of 
not permitting any arms in their territories. In response, indigenous leaders are told that their 
failure to assist that particular armed group constitutes proof that the community is allied with 
the other side. The army in particular refuses to accept this position of “active neutrality,” as has 
the Uribe administration. Certain areas, in particular in Cauca, are subjected to attacks that come 
with numbing regularity. Because the violence disperses communities, an indigenous language 
will likely be discontinued in the new location. Amazonian regions, where entire communities 
are under threat of extinction, reveal the greatest threat of language extinction. Because numbers 
are small and population density is low. When a tiny pueblo like the Koreguaje is threatened and 
persecuted, its members finding they have no option but to leave their territory and join the 
masses of internally displaced citizens, they will very probably not reconstitute themselves as a 
pueblo and the language will die out, especially if families flee to different shanty towns in the 
cascos urbanos. Some of the most persecuted communities have already lost their language; such 
is the case for the reindigenized Kankuamo of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, as well as the 
Zenú of Córdoba and Antioquia in the north.  
The Colombian government has recently expanded its policies directed at protecting the 
country’s ethnolinguistic diversity; a report from the Ministerio de Cultura speaks of “crear y 
desarrollar una política de protección de las lenguas de los grupos étnicos presentes en el 
territorio colombiano” (2010: 1), and on January 25, 2010, Congress passed Law 1381, also 
intended to rocognize, protect, and strengthen the country’s indigenous languages. Although as 
with other similar legislation, there will probably be an absence of political will needed to 
implement the law, it nonetheless represents an innovative legal framing, as well as a message of 
hope to the pueblos. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Given the repression of the 1970s and earlier periods, the shift in the Colombian state’s stance 
toward the nation’s pueblos has indeed been remarkable. Such a stance—one that promotes 
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pueblos’ inclusion in the life of the nation while also encouraging them to remain distinct—
begins a process of working out the nature of such pluralism that of necessity occurs in highly 
politicized contexts. The ANC debates over internal self-determination were fierce, and while 
victory was achieved in several key areas, the resulting document is vague and ambiguous at 
several crucial points. We must keep in mind that the Constitution and the fuero indígena of the 
1980s and 1990s exist only on paper; implementation and enforcement depend on a political will 
that is all too often in scarce supply. The legislation needed to put the reforms in motion has 
slowed to a standstill in some areas, including implementation of the constitutional mandate to 
establish special indigenous collective land ownership intended to strengthen pueblos’ ability to 
administer and protect their territories. The legal, oftentimes constitutional recognition of rights 
is one thing; the oftentimes long and torturous road to actual enforcement on site is another. For 
example, despite the fact that many pueblos have completed mandated planes de vida that 
outline their vision of “ethnodevelopment,” state interests in oil exploration and production often 
clash with pueblos’ own notions of how to exploit their legally recognized territories. 
Recall, also, that ‘the state’ includes the military, which is clearly implicated in current 
repression, directly and directly, of indigenous civilians. 
We also need to remember that, as has happened elsewhere in Latin America, the 
neoliberal multiculturalist rhetorics and legislation promulgated by the Colombian state seek to 
engage the indigenous movement in part to politically reconceptualize it. It is important, 
therefore, to comprehensively understand the nature, actual and potential, of this engagement and 
attempt at reconceptualization. 
 Although a pueblo’s claim to self-determination does not in principle require it to 
immobilize its traditions, both pueblos and state have tended to move toward such forms of 
closure, reifying identity and restricting the dynamism characteristic of customary law and 
traditions. Ideally, Colombia’s indigenous peoples would have the space to transform their 
cultures (and hence their identities) selectively, according to their own customs, rules, and de 
facto realpolitik. But because such processes always involve power relations, internal and 
external, challenges to indigenous authority often take the form of questions about authenticity (a 
thoroughly western concept), questions that began to be posed only recently precisely because 
performances of indigeneity to vindicate claims increasingly occur under extremely politicized 
conditions.  
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A related, also controversial, domain is gender rights. That indigenous women might 
organize to both change their traditional usos y costumbres and defend them illustrates my point 
about selective transformation and the highly politicized arenas in which it must occur. 
The Constitutional Court has repeatedly sought to maximize the autonomy of indigenous 
jurisdiction; however, it has already heard a number of cases involving clashes between a 
pueblo’s judgment and the basic law of the land guaranteeing the right to life and protection from 
slavery, forced exile, and torture. The liberal notion that indigenous rights are the same as human 
rights is seriously challenged upon hearing that pueblo authorities, in keeping with their 
customary laws and newly granted permission to manage their internal affairs, sentence a 
miscreant to be whipped or put into stocks (see, for example, Gow and Rappaport, 2002; Jackson 
2007).  
It must also be kept in mind that any indigenous community will be riddled with 
conflicts, some ongoing, others resolved but not forgotten, as well as factions, hierarchies, and 
decision-making mechanisms that exclude and marginalize some members  The community will, 
in short, display values and actions that are anything but fair, democratic, or egalitarian, as these 
concepts are defined and valorized in the west. (Western institutions and values are no less 
conflict-ridden and exclusionary.) The romantic view of pueblos as cohesive and consensus-
based totalities can be sustained only from a distance. Just how indigenous customary law 
interfaces with codified positive law, and what compromises are necessary, points to the danger 
of imposing Western legal premises and procedures on systems that are anything but codified, 
depending as they do on kinship relations, shamanic consultations, and so forth, and thus differ 
fundamentally from Western notions of justice, due process, and conflict resolution. Negotiation, 
rather than imposition, would seem a more judicious approach to take. 
Pueblos face many other problems, for example, inter-ethnic tensions and polarization 
between Afro-Colombians and pueblos on the Pacific coast, and between Indians and colonos in 
the Amazon and eastern plains regions. The problem of language loss, however, elicits great 
sadness, because it doesn’t have to happen. Elsewhere in the world languages have been brought 
from the brink of extinction and today are being learned by younger generations (cf. Cultural 
Survival Quarterly 2001). In Colombia, there are signs of hope with respect to addressing this 
problem, from the government, the academy, and the pueblos themselves. Clearly it behooves all 
of us to work to encourage such signs in every way possible. 
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1 In Colombia, thanks to all who have helped my research on indigenous organizing during various 
trips. I very much appreciate the opportunity María Stella González has provided with her 
invitation to contribute an essay to this special issue of UniverSOS. The responsibility for the ideas 
set forth here is entirely my own. 
2  The first resguardo legislation, in 1549, stipulated that the Indians would collectively manage 
and work the land, paying tribute to the Crown (see Rappaport 1990: 45-46; Triana 1993: 101-
106).  Efforts in later centuries to expropriate resguardos led to many of them falling into decline. 
